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INTRODUCTION
During 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) issued fifteen trademark decisions, eleven
on substantive issues and four on procedural issues, which was a
1
relatively active year.
However, only a few are precedential
2
decisions. While most of the court’s decisions readily affirmed the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB” or “Board”), there are a
few decisions that are particularly noteworthy where the Federal
Circuit disagreed with either the TTAB’s interpretation or holding.
3
For example, in In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, the Federal Circuit
reversed the Board’s refusal to consider foreign-based online news
sources as evidence of United States public perception, finding that
even information originating from foreign sources may be relevant to
United States consumers’ impressions of a proposed mark if such
4
information is available on the Internet.
In another case, the Federal Circuit clarified that mere use in the
United States, not use in U.S. commerce, is sufficient to sustain an
5
opposition before the Board. It further noted (albeit in a footnote)

1. By comparison, the court issued seventeen decisions in 2003, thirteen
decisions in 2004, twelve decisions in 2005, and ten decisions in 2006.
2. See McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(failure to state a claim); In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(definition of goods); China Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (likelihood of confusion); In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d
960, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (mere descriptiveness); In re Reed Elsevier Props. Inc., 482
F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (genericness); FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc. v.
Carefirst of Md., Inc., 479 F.3d 825, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (excusable neglect); In re
Bose Corp., 476 F.3d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (res judicata); First Niagara Ins.
Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagra Fin. Group, Inc., 476 F.3d 867, 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(mere use versus use in commerce).
3. 488 F.3d at 960.
4. Id. at 969.
5. First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871.

2008]

2007 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

1041

that the Board should apply the correct legal standard even where
6
the parties allege the higher, incorrect standard.
In the only written opinion involving the likelihood of confusion
analysis, the Federal Circuit reversed the TTAB’s finding that the
mark CHI PLUS did not infringe upon the mark CHI (design) for
identical goods, finding the Board had improperly dissected the
7
marks and failed to accord sufficient weight to fame evidence.
Disturbingly, a few opinions involved errors by counsel. The
Federal Circuit affirmed two Board holdings finding no “excusable
8
neglect” for failure to meet deadlines. However, in an opinion
affirmed per curiam, the Federal Circuit did not disturb the Board’s
acceptance of a late-filed brief or relief from untimely admission
responses, in that case looking beyond procedural defects as the
9
merits of the case would be subserved.
Overall, most of the Federal Circuit’s decisions affirmed the
Board’s holdings save for the few noted above and discussed herein,
consistent with the great deference the court gives to agency
decisions.
I.

SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Genericness
10

In re Reed Elsevier Properties Inc.
11
In In re Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
Board’s refusal to register the trademark WWW.LAWYERS.COM as
generic, confirming that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) can look beyond the goods and services recited in a
trademark application to determine whether a mark is descriptive or
12
generic.
In 1998, Reed Elsevier (“Reed”) applied to register
WWW.LAWYERS.COM as a trademark for “[p]roviding access to an
online interactive database featuring information exchange in the
1.

6. Id. at 871 n.1.
7. China Healthways, 491 F.3d at 1341.
8. FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Md., Inc., 479 F.3d 825, 828–
30 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Fischer v. Anderson, No. 2007-1152, 2007 WL 2947324, at *3
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007).
9. Stichting Lodestar v. Austin Nichols & Co., 214 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(per curiam).
10. 482 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1378.
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After
fields of law, lawyers, legal news, and legal services.”
determining that the website at WWW.LAWYERS.COM allows users
14
to research lawyers, ask questions of lawyers and contact lawyers, the
examining attorney rejected the mark as generic of the services
15
identified in Reed’s trademark application.
In what became one of the main issues on appeal, Reed attempted
to salvage its application by deleting “lawyers,” leaving only
“information exchange . . . in the fields of law, legal news, and legal
services” in its recital of goods and services, and re-submitted its
16
application for registration on the Supplemental Register.
The
examining attorney again rejected the application based on
17
genericness. The Board affirmed the examining attorney’s ultimate
refusal, finding that information about legal services is “inextricably”
related to information about lawyers, and that the public would
perceive the mark WWW.LAWYERS.COM as primarily referring to
18
information about lawyers.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the evidence
substantially
supported
the
Board’s
finding
that
19
WWW.LAWYERS.COM constitutes a generic mark. Reed did not
dispute that the public would perceive WWW.LAWYERS.COM as
20
primarily relating to lawyers. The issue on appeal was whether the
Board had erred in considering all of the services offered at
21
www.lawyers.com in finding its mark generic.” According to Reed,
the Board should have limited its inquiry to whether
WWW.LAWYERS.COM is generic for information about legal news
22
and legal services.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 1377.
15. Id. at 1378. To prove that a mark is generic, the Federal Circuit follows a
two-step inquiry: “First, what is the genus of goods or services at issue? Second, is the
term sought to be registered . . . understood by the relevant public primarily to refer
to that genus of goods or services?” Id. (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of
Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
16. Id. at 1377–78.
Descriptive trademarks may be registered on the
Supplemental Register if they have not yet acquired secondary meaning. JEROME
GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE
(TMEP) § 1212.02(c) (4th ed. 2005).
17. Read, 482 F.3d at 1378.
18. Id.
19. Id. The issue of genericness is treated by the Federal Circuit as a question of
fact. Id. The Federal Circuit reviews questions of fact by asking whether the Board’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence. Id.
20. Id. at 1379–80.
21. Id. at 1379.
22. Id. at 1378–79.
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The Federal Circuit concluded that that the evidence substantially
23
supported the Board’s holding. It held that the Board (1) properly
reviewed the website at WWW.LAWYERS.COM in order to give
meaning to the term “legal services” and (2) properly determined
24
that a necessary facet of legal services is information about lawyers.
The court therefore agreed with the Board that information about
legal services is “inextricably intertwined” with information about
25
lawyers and rejected Reed’s argument that the Board had
considered services outside the scope of “information exchange in
26
the field of . . . legal services.” Once the Federal Circuit found that
the genus encompassed information about lawyers, it found that
substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the public
would understand WWW.LAWYERS.COM to primarily relate to the
27
genus of services at issue.
Reed may not involve a novel application of the genericness test.
However, it does remind practitioners that the Board may look
beyond the goods and services recited in a trademark application to
28
inform its decision on whether a mark is descriptive or generic.
B. Mere Descriptiveness
29

In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft
30
In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft posed the question of whether
ASPIRINA is merely descriptive of aspirin and analgesic goods and
31
therefore not allowable as a trademark.
This case presents an
interesting study into the weight accorded to various forms of
evidence, especially foreign articles accessible over the Internet, and
highlights the difficulty of appealing a factual determination by the
Board due to the Federal Circuit’s deferential “substantial evidence”
32
standard of review.
1.

23. Id. at 1378.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1379.
26. Id. at 1378.
27. Id. at 1380.
28. See In re Univ. Fed. Credit Union, No. 78439822, 2007 WL 2219700, at *3
(T.T.A.B. July 23, 2007) (“[I]t is appropriate for the Board to consider the
applicant’s website to understand the meaning of the goods of the services for which
registration is sought.”).
29. 488 F.3d 960 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 962.
32. See id. at 970 (“Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of
review . . . [w]here two different conclusions may be warranted based on the
evidence of record, the Board’s decision to favor one conclusion over the other is the
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Bayer is the owner of the mark ASPIRINA for aspirin and analgesic
33
goods in thirty-four countries worldwide. In 2003, Bayer filed an
intent-to-use application to register ASPIRINA in connection with
34
aspirin and analgesic goods in the United States.
Both the
examining attorney and the Board rejected the application for
ASPIRINA as merely descriptive of the goods at issue and Bayer
35
appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The issue on appeal was whether substantial evidence supported
the Board’s finding that ASPIRINA is merely descriptive of aspirin
36
and analgesic goods. In line with established precedent, the Federal
Circuit stated that “[a] term is merely descriptive if it immediately
conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of
37
Also in line with
the goods or services with which it is used.”
established precedent, the Federal Circuit analyzed both the term
itself and how it is perceived in a marketplace context by average
38
purchasers of the goods.
As to the appearance, sound and meaning of the term ASPIRINA,
the Federal Circuit found that the mere addition of the letter “A” is
“insufficient to transform ASPIRINA into an inherently distinctive
39
mark for analgesics.” It held that (1) the appearance is virtually
identical to the generic term aspirin and therefore immediately
conveys the characteristics of the goods, and that (2) the meaning is
identical because both ASPIRINA and aspirin identify analgesic
40
goods. Lastly, the Federal Circuit remarked that slight differences
in pronunciation cannot overcome the substantial evidence that
41
ASPIRINA is merely descriptive of aspirin.
Taken in its marketplace context, the Federal Circuit likewise
found substantial evidence to support the Board’s holding that
42
ASPIRINA is merely descriptive. The examining attorney proffered
a wide array of evidence showing the descriptive nature of the term
type of decision that must be sustained by this court as supported by substantial
evidence.”).
33. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 962.
35. Id. at 963. The Board held that “consumers will view ASPIRINA as merely a
variation or misspelling of the generic term aspirin and determined that the terms
are close in sound, appearance, and meaning [and] that ASPIRINA immediately
conveys the impression that Bayer’s analgesics are aspirin-based products.” Id.
36. Id. at 964.
37. Id. at 963.
38. Id. at 964.
39. Id. at 965.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 970.
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ASPIRINA, including online translation results, paper dictionary
results, search engine results, and foreign and domestic online news
43
In evaluating the record, the Federal Circuit found
articles.
substantial evidence that ASPIRINA is used as the Spanish language
equivalent of the generic term aspirin and would therefore be
perceived by the United States public as merely descriptive of aspirin
44
and analgesic goods.
In reviewing the Board’s holding, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed
the principle that Internet evidence is generally admissible in
trademark disputes as indicative of public perception and also
provided significant insight into the probative value of each type of
45
Internet evidence before it.
The court first reaffirmed the principle that free online translation
46
results are admissible as evidence of public perception. It next held,
in line with the lower courts, that Google search results are of “little
value” because they do not illustrate the full context in which the
47
mark appears.
Last, and perhaps most significant, the Federal
Circuit reversed the Board’s refusal to consider foreign-based online
48
news sources as evidence of United States public perception. The
court held that the Internet is a growing resource for news and that
“[i]nformation originating on foreign websites or in foreign news
publications that are accessible to the United States public may be
relevant to discern United States consumer impression of a proposed
49
mark.” This statement should end disparate treatment of the issue
50
by examiners and the TTAB and is already being cited by the TTAB
51
for this proposition.
43. Id. at 965–70.
44. Id. at 970. Although the Federal Circuit explicitly declined to undertake an
analysis of foreign equivalents, Judge Newman, in dissent, criticized the majority for
relying on evidence showing the term ASPIRINA to be the foreign equivalent of a
generic term and then using that evidence to support its finding of mere
descriptiveness. Id. at 973.
45. See id. at 966 (“Internet evidence is generally admissible and may be
considered for purposes of evaluating a trademark.”) (citation omitted); see also
GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 16, § 710.01(b) (“Articles downloaded from the
Internet are admissible as evidence of information available to the general public,
and of the way in which a term is being used by the public. However, the weight
given to this evidence must be carefully evaluated, because the source is often
unknown.”).
46. In re Bayer, 488 F.3d at 966 (noting that if the public accesses such services,
they are probative of public perception).
47. Id. at 967.
48. Id. at 969.
49. Id.
50. Compare In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, No. 78212751, 2005 WL 3395183, at
*3 n.3 (T.T.A.B. Dec. 1, 2005) (noting that U.S. consumers are exposed to
translations of foreign websites), with In re King Koil Licensing Co., No. 76565486,
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52

In re Finisar Corp.
53
In In re Finisar Corp., the Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the
Board’s holding that SMARTSFP is merely descriptive of optical
54
The Board’s analysis involves a straightforward
transceivers.
application of the descriptiveness test, illustrating the difference
55
between a descriptive and suggestive mark.
A mark is descriptive if “it immediately conveys information
concerning a quality, characteristic, function, ingredient, attribute or
feature of the product or service in connection with which it is used,
56
or intended to be used.” The mark must be considered in relation
to the goods and services listed in the application and in light of the
57
average purchaser’s perception of the mark.
The issue on appeal was whether SFP and SMART, taken together,
58
are merely descriptive of optical receivers. While the Board noted
that SFP is an acronym for “small form-factor pluggable” optical
59
receivers, Finisar argued that average consumers are unaware of the
acronym SFP and would not immediately connect SFP with optical
60
receivers. The Board responded that ordinary customers of Finisar’s
goods—the proper standard—would immediately recognize the term
2.

2006 WL 639160, at *2 (T.T.A.B. Mar. 2, 2006) (refusing to consider that U.S.
consumers would turn to foreign websites), and In re Remacle, No. 75932290, 2002
WL 31563187, at *2–3 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2002) (reversing a decision in which
foreign materials were used as evidence against the applicant).
51. See, e.g., In re The Univ. of B.C., No. 78700787, 2007 WL 3095398 (T.T.A.B.
Oct. 18, 2007); In re Johnson & Johnson, Inc., No. 78518703, 2007 WL 2972210
(T.T.A.B. Sept. 20, 2007); In re SJP, LLC, No. 76620345, 2007 WL 2698287 (T.T.A.B.
Aug. 31, 2007); In re Grape Tech. Group, Inc., No. 76578484, 2007 WL 2344676
(T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2007); In re Salzgitter Flachstahl GMBH, No. 79007387, 2007 WL
1893923, at *5 (T.T.A.B. June 27, 2007) (“The Federal Circuit recently endorsed and
encouraged the use of these foreign Internet publications.”).
52. 223 F. App’x 984 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 985.
55. In re Finisar Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1618, 1619 (T.T.A.B. 2006), aff’d, 223 F.
App’x 984 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
56. Id. (citation omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1618–19. Optical receivers are “highly automated devices that imitate
human intelligence by self monitoring and reporting operational and diagnostic
information.” Id. at 1621.
59. Id. at 1619. In so doing, the Board relied on the website http://www.acrony
mfinder.com. Id. This website is similar to Wikipedia insofar as users can develop
and edit their own entries. See generally John L. Welch, The Board’s Eye-View: Six
Potential Pitfalls in Trademark Prosecution 13–15, http://www.ll-a.com/welch/ATD
_Six_Pitfalls.pdf (questioning the reliability of the acronym website).
60. Finisar Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1619.
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61

as referring to Finisar’s optical receivers. Accordingly, the Board
62
found SFP descriptive of optical transceivers.
Next, the Board observed that the definition of SMART includes
63
“highly automated” and “containing electronic control devices.”
The Board also found significant evidence in the form of third-party
64
websites showing “smart” in connection with transceivers. Finisar
again took the query out of context, arguing that “smart” is a broad
and general term that does not immediately convey a consistent
65
meaning. However, in the context of optical receivers, the Board
found that SMART immediately conveyed the characteristic that
Finisar’s goods are “highly automated and capable of computing
66
information.” Accordingly, the Board found that the term SMART
is also merely descriptive when used in connection with optical
67
receivers.
The Board ultimately held that the “straightforward combination”
of SMARTSFP does not create an incongruous or unique commercial
impression, or require mental pause or thought to determine the
68
Thus, SMARTSFP is merely descriptive of
nature of the goods.
69
automated optical transceivers. This case serves as a reminder that
70
acronyms can be found merely descriptive and that two descriptive
terms, when presented in a “straightforward combination” without
71
design elements, do not automatically become a suggestive mark.
C. Likelihood of Confusion
The Federal Circuit issued three opinions in 2007 involving claims
72
of a likelihood of confusion. Two of these opinions were issued per
curiam affirming the Board’s holdings, demonstrating the Federal

61. Id. at 1620.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1622.
65. Id. at 1621.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1620.
68. Id. at 1623.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., In re Sanofi-Aventis, No. 78278816, 2006 WL 2303376, at *6
(T.T.A.B. July 24, 2006) (“[E]ven acronyms may be merely descriptive of an
applicant’s goods or services.” (citation omitted)).
71. Finisar Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1623.
72. See China Healthways Inst., Inc. v. Wang, 491 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Suzlon Wind Energy Corp., 214 F. App’x 987 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); Stichting Lodestar v. Austin, Nichols & Co., 214 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
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Circuit’s deferential “substantial evidence” standard of review for the
73
Board’s factual findings.
74

Stichting Lodestar v. Austin, Nichols & Co.
75
In Stichting Lodestar v. Austin, Nichols & Co., the Federal Circuit
affirmed, per curiam, the Board’s decision that applicant Stichting’s
mark WILD GEESE for beers, colas, and alcoholic beverages
infringed upon opposer Austin, Nichols & Co.’s (“Austin Nichols”)
76
mark WILD TURKEY for various alcoholic beverages.
Before addressing the substantive issue presented by this case, the
Board addressed numerous mistakes committed by Austin Nichols
77
throughout the opposition proceeding.
Fortunately for Austin
Nichols, failures to timely submit its admissions responses and main
brief did not affect it in the present case, as the Board (and Federal
Circuit) were willing to look beyond procedural defects as the merits
78
of the case would be subserved.
Austin Nichols failed to timely serve its responses to applicant’s first
79
set of admissions. As a result, Austin Nichols was faced with multiple
80
default admissions and moved the Board to accept its late responses.
The Board treated its motion as one to withdraw its default
81
admissions under Federal Rule 36(b).
Federal Rule 36(b) asks
whether “the merits of the action will be subserved” by the motion to
withdraw and whether the party opposing the motion will be
82
prejudiced by the withdrawal.
Because some of the applicant’s
questions asked Austin Nichols to admit facts that were patently
untrue—i.e., that WILD TURKEY is not used in connection with
whiskey—the Board found that the merits of the case would be
1.

73. In the likelihood of confusion analysis in the Federal Circuit, the Board’s
conclusion on each confusion factor is a factual determination reviewed under the
“substantial evidence” standard of review while the ultimate legal conclusion as to
whether confusion is likely—which involves a weighing of the factors—is reviewed de
novo. China Healthways, 491 F.3d at 1339.
74. 214 F. App’x 979 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
75. Id.
76. Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Stichting Lodestar, No. 91155165, 2006 WL 236409,
at *1.
77. Id. at *1–2 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2006).
78. See infra notes 79–87 and accompanying text (explaining the Board’s
reasoning).
79. Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *1.
80. Id. at *1–2.
81. Id. at *2.
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b) (stating that admissions may be withdrawn if “the
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that
party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits.”).
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subserved by the withdrawal of Austin Nichols’ admissions. It also
84
found that the applicant would not be prejudiced by the withdrawal.
Austin Nichols also submitted its main brief on the case two days
85
late. Its brief was due on a Saturday and counsel for Austin Nichols
86
did not submit the brief until the following Monday. Taking Austin
Nichols’ excuse at face value that the delay was not willful, the Board
accepted Austin Nichols brief “because it benefits the Board in its
ability to make a just determination of the case to have the briefs of
87
both parties of record.”
88
In applying the likelihood of confusion factors, the Board focused
on the following factors, often considered the most important of the
thirteen factors: (1) fame of the prior mark, (2) similarities between
89
the marks, and (3) similarities between the goods and/or services.
Of great importance to Austin Nichols was the fame of the WILD
90
TURKEY mark. The Board emphasized Austin Nichols’ length of
use (over sixty years), widespread sales ($65 million and 500,000 cases
of whiskey sold), advertising expenditures (over $10 million), strong
91
brand identity, point-of-sale marketing, and media exposure.

83. Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *2.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *3.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The Federal Circuit applies a thirteen-factor test to determine whether
consumer confusion is likely, which considers the following factors:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation[,] and commercial impression[;] (2) [t]he
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use[;] (3) [t]he similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue
trade channels[;] (4) [t]he conditions under which and buyers to whom
sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing[;]
(5) [t]he fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use)[;]
(6) [t]he number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods[;]
(7) [t]he nature and extent of any actual confusion[;] (8) [t]he length of
time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use
without evidence of actual confusion[;] (9) [t]he variety of goods on which a
mark is or is not used (house mark, “family” mark, product mark)[;]
(10) [t]he market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior
mark[;] (11) [t]he extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others
from use of its mark on its goods[;] (12) [t]he extent of potential confusion,
i.e., whether de minimis or substantial[; and] (13) [a]ny other established fact
probative of the effect of use.
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
89. Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *6–7.
90. See id. (underscoring the importance of fame as one of the DuPont factors
used for determining consumer confusion).
91. Id.
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Stichting did not present any rebuttal evidence, and the Board found
92
the WILD TURKEY mark famous and entitled to broad protection.
Citing well-settled law, the Board noted that goods need not be
93
identical or directly competitive to be considered similar. However,
the Board found that the goods in the parties’ registrations, beer and
94
alcoholic beverages, were identical or nearly identical. Given the
great similarity between the goods, the Board found that two
additional DuPont factors—the marketing channels and class of
95
purchasers—also favored Austin Nichols.
On the issue of the similarity of the marks, the Board found that
WILD GEESE and WILD TURKEY are similar “when compared in
their entireties in terms of appearance, sound, connotation and
96
Specifically, it found that each mark
commercial impression.”
contained the word WILD in combination with a game bird, which
gave rise to a confusingly similar commercial impression when used
97
in connection with beer and alcoholic beverages.
The Board was unswayed by Stichting’s arguments on the
(dis)similarity of the marks. First, Stichting dissected the marks in its
98
analysis, violating the long-standing anti-dissection rule of trademark
99
Stichting also proffered third-party registrations, ostensibly
law.
showing that the common term WILD has “ordinary significance” in
100
the field of beverages.
However, the Board found that the word
WILD in the third party registrations had disparate meanings and
101
connotations and therefore carried little weight.
Given Austin Nichols’ strong showing on five of the likelihood of
confusion factors, the Board concluded that Stichting’s mark was
barred from registration under § 2(d) of the Federal Trademark
102
Act.

92. Id. at *7.
93. See id. (opining that the goods need only be related in some manner such
that consumers encountering the goods in the marketplace could believe that they
come from the same source (citing In re Martin’s Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1984))).
94. Id.
95. Id. at *8.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *8–10.
98. Id. at *10.
99. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that
“marks must be compared in their entireties and must be considered in connection
with the particular goods or services for which they are used” (citation omitted)).
100. Austin, Nichols & Co., 2006 WL 236409, at *9.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *10; see infra note 179.
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National Rural Electric Cooperative Association v. Suzlon Wind
103
Energy Corp.
In National Rural Electric Cooperative Association v. Suzlon Wind Energy
104
Corp, yet another per curiam decision, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board’s holding that Suzlon Wind Energy Corporation’s
(“Suzlon”) design mark did not infringe the design mark of National
105
Rural Electric Cooperative Association (“National Rural”).
This case began as a cancellation proceeding before the
106
National Rural
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board in 2004.
petitioned to cancel Suzlon’s mark on the basis that confusion was
107
likely between its mark:
2.

and Suzlon’s mark:

108

The Board first assessed the similarity of the marks in terms of
appearance, sound, and connotation, finding differences in the
appearance of the marks because Suzlon’s mark consists of three
109
lines versus National Rural’s five. The Board also found differences
in connotation, finding that the marks are abstract and, therefore,
110
open to endless interpretation by consumers.
On the question of
sound, the Board said it would be “remiss” to overlook the “important
111
difference” of an arbitrary word mark in Suzlon’s design. National
Rural argued that some of its association members display their name
underneath the National Rural logo, much like Suzlon’s mark, but
103. 214 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
104. Id.
105. Id. at *1.
106. Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. Suzlon Wind Energy Corp., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d
1881, 1882 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1882–83.
109. Id. at 1884.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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112

the Board was not convinced. Overall, the Board found the degree
113
of similarity “not great.”
On the relatedness of the goods and services, the Board is bound
114
by those identified in the parties’ registrations.
National Rural’s
registration covers publications, workshops, seminars, and association
services in the field of rural electrification, while Suzlon’s registration
115
covers wind turbines and their components.
National Rural argued that the goods are directly related, noting
that its associational services include wind energy counseling and
stressing Suzlon’s admission that “the goods and services used with
116
the respective marks fall in the energy industry.”
However, the
Board rejected this assertion, concluding that even a passing review
of the goods and services revealed that they were neither identical
117
nor closely related.
The Board further noted that “[m]erely
because parties operate in the same broad industry does not, by itself,
118
establish that their goods and services are related.”
Accordingly,
the Board found that the goods and services were at best “tenuously”
119
related.
When considering the sophistication of consumers and the care
taken in purchasing the parties’ goods and services, the Board found
that purchasers of wind turbines and energy cooperatives are
sophisticated and exercise care in purchasing turbines and joining
120
121
energy associations. These factors favored Suzlon.
National Rural proffered evidence that one of its customers saw
122
Suzlon’s mark and thought it belonged to National Rural.
Even
though actual confusion is normally afforded great weight in the
123
confusion analysis, the Board was not swayed by the evidence. In
this “single instance of alleged actual confusion,” the customer had
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (relying on Paula Payne Prods. Co. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901
(C.C.P.A. 1973), to show that using only the description of goods and services
provided in the registration is a well-established TTAB practice).
115. Id. at 1885.
116. Id. (quoting National Rural’s brief).
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing Saks & Co. v. Snack Food Ass’n, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1833, 1835
(T.T.A.B. 1989)); see Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“[A] broad general market category is not a generally reliable test of
relatedness of products.”).
119. Nat’l Rural, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1886.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. (“A showing of actual confusion would of course be highly probative, if
not conclusive, of a high likelihood of confusion.” (quoting In re Majestic Distilling
Co., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003))).

2008]

2007 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

1053

failed to consider the goods and services offered in connection with
124
Accordingly, the Board found the evidence equivocal
the mark.
125
and insignificant.
126
Overall, the Board found confusion unlikely.
This is an
interesting case where the inclusion of a word in a design mark was
127
an “important difference” in assessing mark similarity. Further, this
case is an instructive example of how goods and services are not
necessarily related even when marketed within the same broad
industry.
128

China Healthways Institute, Inc. v. Wang
The Federal Circuit issued only one written opinion in 2007
129
involving the likelihood of confusion analysis. In China Healthways
130
Institute, Inc. v. Wang, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s
finding that the trademark CHI PLUS does not infringe upon the
mark CHI, holding that the marks are confusingly similar and the
131
goods, consumers, and marketing channels identical.
This dispute involves competitors who both wished to use the mark
132
CHI in connection with electric massagers. In 2002, Wang applied
for trademark protection for the mark CHI PLUS in connection with
133
electric massage apparatuses.
China Healthways Institute, Inc.
(“China Healthways”) already owned a trademark registration for
CHI, in connection with electric therapeutic massagers, and opposed
134
Wang’s application.
In its initial ruling below, the Board rejected China Healthways’
135
opposition, finding confusion unlikely.
Significantly, the Board
found the marks to be dissimilar. The Board “found that ‘CHI’ is a
weak component of the marks, and the other components of the
136
marks adequately distinguish them.” To support its conclusion that
CHI was a weak component, the Board found that “chi” means vital
energy in Chinese and is suggestive, if not descriptive, of the
3.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1887.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1884.
491 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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137

The Board then found that differences such as the
massagers.
lettering, design elements, and the addition of the word PLUS
138
sufficiently distinguished the two marks.
The issue before the Federal Circuit on appeal turned primarily on
139
the similarity of the marks. In that appeal, the court found that the
Board violated the longstanding anti-dissection rule of trademark
140
law.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit rejected a comparison that
eliminated portions of marks and then simply compared the
141
remainder. Instead, according to the court, the correct comparison
involves consideration of the marks in their entirety and in light of
142
their respective commercial impressions.
In particular, the Federal Circuit objected to the Board’s disposal
of the word mark CHI on the grounds that the word is descriptive
143
and thus a weak component of the overall marks.
The Federal
Circuit first explained that the word “chi” does not mean electric
144
massager and is therefore not a descriptive component of the mark.
Further, the word CHI is an “integral” and “major component” of
145
both marks, and minor distinctions, such as the lettering, design
146
elements, and the word PLUS did not render the marks dissimilar
when viewed in their entirety and in light of their overall commercial
147
impressions.
After reversing the Board on its finding of mark similarity, the
court further noted that the Board should have accepted China
Healthways’ evidence of actual confusion “to the extent that it was

137. Id. at 1339–40.
138. Id. at 1340.
139. Id. at 1339.
140. See id. at 1340 (noting that trademarks must be examined as a whole,
especially when “the overall commercial impression is reasonably based on the
entirety of the marks” (citation omitted)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1341.
144. Id. Interestingly, elsewhere in the opinion the Federal Circuit noted that
“[t]he word CHI has significant descriptive aspects that raise the likelihood of
confusion and weigh against registration of multiple marks for identical goods.” Id.
at 1340. This belies the principle alluded to by the Board that weak common
elements reduce the likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Cont’l Grain Co. v. Cent. Soya
Co., No. 95-1249, 1995 WL 649500, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 1995) (“Where the
common element of conflicting marks is ‘weak’ in the sense that such portion is
descriptive, highly suggestive, or is in common use by many sellers in the market,
then this reduces the likelihood of confusion.” (citation omitted)).
145. China Healthways, 491 F.3d at 1340–41.
146. The court noted that the word “plus” normally connotes a superior product,
not a wholly different one. Id. at 1341.
147. Id.
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148

Additionally, the Federal Circuit found that
properly proffered.”
149
the Board erred in its assessment of the fame of the mark CHI.
Because fame is partially measured by sales volume and length of
advertising, and China Healthways had sold tens of thousands of its
massagers over more than ten years, the Federal Circuit found that
the Board had accorded insufficient weight to CHI on the fame
150
factor.
China Healthways may prove to be an important case to watch
considering that the Federal Circuit offered conflicting opinions on
the descriptiveness of the mark CHI. At one point, the court stated
that CHI does not mean electric massagers (and is therefore not
151
At another, however, it stated that CHI has
descriptive).
152
“significant descriptive aspects.” Taking the final position that CHI
is not descriptive, the court’s criticism of the Board’s dissection of the
mark is sound. However, if the mark CHI in fact does have
significant descriptive aspects, then the Board properly followed
Federal Circuit precedent that allows the elimination of weak aspects
153
and comparison of the residue.
D. Definition of Goods
154

In re Omega SA
155
In In re Omega SA, the Federal Circuit upheld the USPTO’s
refusal to register a mark unless the applicant amended its
application to limit its identification of goods to those specifically
156
within International Class 14, even though Omega argued that by
virtue of the class identification, the goods would be understood to
1.

148. Id. The Federal Circuit did not explain what it meant by “properly
proffered.” The court noted that the Board excluded China Healthways’s evidence
because it was not introduced during the assigned testimony period. Id. The Federal
Circuit did not explain whether the Board was correct or whether it should have
accepted the evidence outside the assigned period. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1340; see supra note 144 (highlighting the possible contradiction within
the Federal Circuit’s opinion).
153. See Cont’l Grain Co. v. Cent. Soya Co., Inc., No. 95-1249, 1995 WL 649500, at
*2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 6, 1995) (“[T]he Board in its analysis acted within the antidissection rule under our precedent in analyzing the ‘common weak elements’ of the
marks.”).
154. 494 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
155. Id.
156. The TTAB originally ruled that applicant’s registration was too broad
because it potentially applied to goods under both Class 14 and Class 9 of the
International Classification for trademark registration. Id. at 1363–64.
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157

Despite Omega’s concern that the
be automatically limited.
limitation of the identification of goods in the registration may
adversely affect its prior trademark registrations for the same goods
that did not include the additional restricting language, the Federal
Circuit accepted the USPTO’s assurance that the imposition of this
requirement in a subsequent registration would not affect existing
158
registrations.
Omega applied to register the mark AQUA TERRA in Class 14 for
“jewelry, precious stones; watches, watch straps, watch bracelets and
parts thereof; chronometers, chronographs, watches made of
precious metals, watches partly or entirely set with precious stones in
159
International Class 14.” However, the Trademark Attorney rejected
the application, stating that “chronographs” can refer to Class 9 time
160
recording devices as well as Class 14 watches.
The USPTO referred “to the online Acceptable Identification of Goods
161
and Services Manual, which identifies ‘chronographs for use as
specialized time recording apparatuses’ as classified in International
Class 9, whereas ‘chronographs for use as watches’ or ‘chronographs
162
Declining to
for use as timepieces’ are in International Class 14.”
amend its identification, Omega argued that it had “several [existing]
registered trademarks in Class 14 for use with ‘watches and
chronographs’ and that the term ‘chronographs’ includes timepieces
such as watches, whether or not ‘chronographs’ is also used for time
163
recording instruments.” Omega further asserted that because Class
14 does not include time recording instruments, the USPTO’s
requirement to restrict the definition of goods is inconsistent with its
other registrations in Class 14, specifically a parent Swiss registration
“based on International Class 14, which includes ‘chronographs
164
[watches],’ ‘chronometers,’ and ‘chronometrical instruments.’”
Omega next argued “that the term ‘chronograph’ is internationally
understood in the watch industry, [but did not] dispute that
157. Id. at 1364.
158. Id. at 1365.
159. Id. at 1363 (referencing the original Board decision, In re Omega SA (Omega
I), No. 78192104, 2005 WL 3175147, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2005)).
160. Id. at 1363–64.
161. The United States has adopted the International Classification for the
registration of trademarks. GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 16, § 1401.02 (“As of
September 1, 1973, the international classification of goods and services is the
primary classification used by the United States, and it applies to all applications filed
on or after September 1, 1973, and their resulting registrations, for all statutory
purposes.” (citing 37 C.F.R. § 2.85)).
162. Omega, 494 F.3d at 1364.
163. Id.
164. Id. (alteration in original).

2008]

2007 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

1057
165

‘chronograph’ can also designate time recording instruments.”
Finally, Omega stated that the “limitation of ‘chronograph’ to
watches necessarily follows when registration is in International Class
14, [and that it need not be further limited] since the only
166
chronographs in Class 14 are watches.”
The Federal Circuit confirmed that the definition of goods in one
registration does not taint the definition of similar goods in any other
registrations, thereby accepting the USPTO’s arguments that “third
parties cannot challenge prior registrations based on terminology
used in an ID in a more recent application/registration,” and that
there would be no retroactive effect on an applicant’s existing
167
registrations or place those prior registrations at risk. The Federal
Circuit held that it is within the USPTO’s “authority to develop
particularized definitions that are ‘more extensive and specific than
the Alphabetical List of Goods and Services that is published by
WIPO [World Intellectual Property Organization]’ . . . and to require
168
compliance with such definitions.” Furthermore, the International
Classification does not prohibit the imposition of additional
169
requirements for national registration.
Omega expressed concern regarding inconsistent examination
170
requirements that place an inappropriate burden on applicants.
The Federal Circuit agreed that consistency is “highly desirable” and
that the time and expense of complying with inconsistent
applications burdens both the USPTO and the public; however, it
found that the requirement in this particular case was not so
unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention into the USPTO
171
Finding that the scope of the term
examination process.
“chronographs” is ambiguous for registration purposes because it
includes both watches and time recording devices, the Federal Circuit
held that the USPTO has “discretion to determine whether and how
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1365 (quoting the brief filed by the USPTO).
168. Id. (quoting GILSON & LALONDE, supra note 16, § 1402.04) (citation
omitted). The court in Omega incorrectly attributed the quoted language to
§ 1401.02(c) of the TMEP. Id.
169. See id. (illustrating that domestic requirements can differ so long as they do
not significantly alter the international classifications); GILSON & LALONDE, supra
note 16, § 1401.02(c) (“[B]ecause the international list was developed to classify
goods and services and not to identify specific goods and services, most entries will
not be sufficiently definite to use in an identification of goods or services.” (emphasis
added)).
170. Omega, 494 F.3d at 1365.
171. Id.; see Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Courts should
not readily intervene in the day-to-day operations of an administrative agency.”).
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a trademark registration should include a more particularized
172
statement of the goods for which the mark is to be used.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the Trademark Examining
Attorney’s requirement in “determining that the term
‘chronographs’ in the registration should be restricted to those ‘for
173
use as watches’” was within the USPTO’s discretionary authority.
E. Use v. Use in Commerce
First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Financial
174
Group, Inc.
In First Niagara Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. First Niagara Financial Group,
175
Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed a TTAB decision dismissing an
opposition to intent-to-use applications and clarified that the “use”
required to challenge an application for registration is merely “use in
176
the United States” and not “use in commerce.”
The TTAB’s
analysis of whether the party opposing the trademark’s registration
had shown use in commerce was unwarranted given the plain language
of the applicable statute, which merely requires that the prior mark
177
be “used in the United States by another.”
First Niagara Financial Group, Inc. (“FN-US”), an insurance
brokerage firm, filed intent-to-use applications at the USPTO for
various marks, including the term FIRST NIAGRA, in connection
178
First Niagara Insurance
with its insurance brokerage services.
Brokers, Inc. (“FN-Canada”), an insurance broker operating out of
Canada, opposed each of FN-US’s applications on the basis that FN179
US’s marks were likely to cause confusion with its own. FN-Canada
did not have any physical presence in the United States, such as
180
Nor was it licensed to act as an
offices, employees, or assets.

1.

172. Omega, 494 F.3d at 1365.
173. Id.
174. 476 F.3d 867 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 871.
177. Id. at 870 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000)).
178. Id. at 869.
179. Id. In opposing FN-US’s registration, FN-Canada relied on section 2(d) of
the Lanham Act, which provides that a trademark shall be refused registration if it
“[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United
States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.”
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
180. First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 868.
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181

It did, however, both sell
insurance broker in the United States.
insurance policies issued by U.S.-based underwriting companies and
sell, through insurance brokers in the United States, policies to U.S.
182
citizens holding Canadian property. FN-Canada does not own any
registered U.S. trademarks, but regularly uses several unregistered
marks, including FIRST NIAGRA and FIRST NIAGRA INSURANCE
BROKERS, in advertising that “spills over” into the United States and
183
in correspondence to customers in the United States.
FN-US argued that FN-Canada “could not establish the priority
necessary to prevail on a likelihood-of-confusion claim because it had
184
not used its marks ‘in commerce’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1127.”
The
TTAB dismissed FN-Canada’s protests, reasoning that any
connections FN-Canada has with the United States were “de minimis
and merely incidental to [FN-Canada’s] rendering of its insurance
185
The Board further held that
brokerage services in Canada.”
“[s]uch activities do not constitute rendering of insurance brokerage
186
services in either interstate or foreign commerce.”
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the TTAB erroneously
187
framed the issue as use in commerce regulated by Congress.
The
court held that such an assumption was unwarranted in light of the
plain language of the statute, which requires only that the prior mark
188
The privilege to claim
be “used in the United States by another.”
priority under section 2(d) based solely on intrastate use of a mark
“attaches to all opposers, regardless of whether they are foreign or

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 869.
184. Id. The referenced section of the Lanham Act defines “use in commerce” as
the “bona fide use of a [trade]mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely
to reserve the right to a mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
185. First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 869–70 (alteration in original) (quoting First
Niagara Ins. Brokers Inc. v. First Niagara Fin. Group Inc. (First Niagara I), 77
U.S.P.Q.2d 1334, 1344 (T.T.A.B. 2005)).
186. Id. at 870 (quoting First Niagara I, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1344) (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 870–71. Section 45 of the Lanham Act requires that marks be used in
commerce in order to be registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000).
188. First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 870 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2000)); see Nat’l
Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1578 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Were failure to show ‘use in commerce’ a bar to petitioning for
cancellation of a registration, a party could never cancel a mark based solely on
intrastate use. This is not the law.”). The Federal Circuit in First Niagara further
noted that even the Board opinion below stated that “[a]n opposer claiming priority
under section 2(d) may rely on use that is strictly intrastate and not regulable by
Congress.” First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871 (quoting First Niagara I, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1341 n.15).
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189

Accordingly, a foreign opposer can oppose a mark
domestic.”
190
merely by demonstrating use of its marks in the United States.
The court noted that, despite the plain language of the statute
requiring mere use and the precedent of National Cable Television
191
Association, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., “FN-Canada did not
object to FN-US and the Board framing the issue as ‘use in
192
commerce.’” The Board had apparently found that FN-Canada had
“waived the right to argue its case on the correct lesser use
193
On appeal, FN-Canada did not challenge the
requirement.”
Board’s assumption of waiver, arguing its use satisfied use in
194
commerce.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit noted in a footnote
that, “in future cases where a section 2(d) challenge is mounted, the
Board should apply the correct test even where use in interstate or
195
foreign commerce is alleged.”
Applying the correct test, the
Federal Circuit held that the Board erred in dismissing FN-Canada’s
oppositions as the record revealed more than ample use of FNCanada’s marks in the United States to satisfy the use requirements of
196
section 2(d).
F.

No “Excusable Neglect”
197

FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc.
198
In FirstHealth of Carolinas, Inc. v. Carefirst of Maryland, Inc., the
Federal Circuit reviewed a Board decision denying a FirstHealth
motion to reopen the testimony period for failure to show “excusable
199
neglect” and dismissing FirstHealth’s counterclaims.
FirstHealth filed intent-to-use trademark applications for the mark
FIRSTCAROLINACARE in connection with healthcare insurance
claims administration and health maintenance organizations
200
CareFirst opposed both applications, alleging a
(“HMOs”).
201
likelihood of confusion with, and dilution of, its mark CAREFIRST.
FirstHealth counterclaimed against CareFirst, seeking to cancel the
1.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871.
Id.
937 F.2d at 1578 n.4.
First Niagara, 476 F.3d at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 871 n.1.
Id. at 871.
479 F.3d 825 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 827–28.
Id. at 827.
Id.
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trademark registrations for CAREFIRST “based on abandonment due
to uncontrolled licensing of the mark and failure to use the mark in
202
connection with services other than HMO services.”
The parties had entered into a stipulation extending FirstHealth’s
203
Nearly a
case-in-chief testimony period until January 31, 2004.
month later, on February 26, 2004, FirstHealth filed a motion to
reopen its testimony period to introduce evidence to support its
counterclaims, including discovery depositions, responses, and
204
FirstHealth listed the
certified copies of third-party registrations.
birth of counsel’s son, the significant amount of testimony that was
taken, time conflicts with counsel’s other matters, and a new
205
However,
paralegal’s docketing error as reasons for its late filing.
the Board denied FirstHealth’s motion to reopen its testimony
206
period, finding that it had not shown excusable neglect. Thus, the
Board dismissed FirstHealth’s counterclaims for cancellation due to
207
lack of supporting evidence.
The Federal Circuit noted that the
Board, in its initial ruling, “also dismissed CareFirst’s oppositions,
finding that there was no likelihood of confusion with or dilution of
208
[CareFirst’s] registered mark.”
The Federal Circuit’s standard of review when examining whether
the Board erred in denying a motion for failure to show excusable
209
neglect is abuse of discretion.
The court noted that, while the
Board’s regulations do allow testimony periods to be reopened upon
a showing of “excusable neglect,” they do not articulate the meaning
210
As a result of this lack of a definition, FirstHealth
of that term.
argued on appeal that the Board had abused its discretion in
applying the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Pioneer
211
The
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership.
202. Id.
203. See id. (noting that the parties’ agreement was made pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.121). This section of the Code of Federal Regulations permits parties to extend
testimony periods by agreement and with the permission of the T.T.A.B. 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.121(c) (2007).
204. FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 827.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 828 (citation omitted).
209. Id.; see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Olympus Corp., 931 F.2d 1551, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (stating that the relevant examination in excusable neglect cases is whether or
not the Board abused its discretion when dismissing a motion or claim).
210. FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 829; see 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(a) (observing that inter partes
proceedings before the Board are generally governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
211. FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 828. In Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd.
P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Supreme Court laid out a definition for the term
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Federal Circuit in FirstHealth explained that, under Pioneer, the
determination of whether a party’s neglect is excusable is:
[a]t bottom an equitable one, taking account of all relevant
circumstances surrounding the party’s omission. These include . . .
[1] the danger of prejudice to the [non-moving party], [2] the
length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial
proceedings, [3] the reason for the delay, including whether it was
within the reasonable control of the movant, and [4] whether the
212
movant acted in good faith.

The Board adopted the Pioneer factors for determining excusable
213
neglect in Pumpkin Ltd. v. Seed Corps. and held that the third
factor—the reason for the delay and whether it was within the
214
The
reasonable control of the movant—is the most important.
court in FirstHealth noted that while the Board was not required to
adopt the interpretation of “excusable neglect” set forth in Pioneer,
doing so was reasonable and the court would defer to that
215
interpretation.
The court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in
216
denying FirstHealth’s motion. The reasons FirstHealth gave for the
217
delay were wholly within its reasonable control. The Federal Circuit
dismissed FirstHealth’s complaint of a “docketing error” as belied by
FirstHealth’s own reference to the January 31, 2004 deadline in a
218
As to
motion it filed prior to the deadline’s expiration.
FirstHealth’s claim that family matters caused delay, FirstHealth had
failed to explain why other authorized individuals in the same firm

“excusable neglect” while examining the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Id.
at 395.
212. FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 829 (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395) (footnote
omission and alterations in original).
213. 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1582 (T.T.A.B. 1997). In Pumpkin, the Board denied a
motion to reopen the testimony period because the reason for delay—a docketing
error—was “wholly within the reasonable control of the [the movant],” applying the
third factor in Pioneer. Id. at 1587. Further, the Board noted that its interest in
deterring delay due to “sloppy practice or inattention to deadlines” was relevant to
the second Pioneer factor, and also weighed heavily against a finding of excusable
neglect. Id. at 1587–88.
214. Old Nutfield Brewing Co. v. Hudson Valley Brewing Co., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
1701, 1702 (T.T.A.B. 2002) (citing Pumpkin, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1586 n.7).
215. FirstHealth, 479 F.3d at 829 (citing Custom Computer Servs., Inc. v. Paychex
Props., Inc., 337 F.3d 1334, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003), as “deferring to the Board’s
interpretation of ‘mistake’ in the context of 37 C.F.R. § 2.102(b)”).
216. Id. at 830.
217. Id. at 829–30. The stipulated motion that extended the testimony period to
January 31, 2004 accounted for two of the reasons for the delay—FirstHealth’s
witness schedules and conflicts with counsels’ schedules. Id.
218. Id. at 830.
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could not have assumed responsibility for the case. Finding that, as
in Pumpkin, the second and third factors weighed against excusable
neglect, the Federal Circuit held that the Board did not abuse its
discretion in denying FirstHealth’s motion to reopen the testimony
220
period.
The Federal Circuit also found the Board’s finding that FirstHealth
failed to prove uncontrolled licensing or failure to use by a
preponderance of the evidence was supported by substantial
221
Without the properly excluded evidence, FirstHealth
evidence.
failed to meet its burden of proving abandonment by a
222
preponderance of the evidence.
223

224

Fischer v. Anderson and Fischer v. Quad International Inc.
225
In Fischer v. Anderson, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s
226
The Board
denial of Fischer’s motion for relief from judgment.
granted judgment against Fischer on the pleadings, sustaining
Anderson’s opposition to Fischer’s application for registration of the
227
mark CHLOE VEVRIER and refusing registration of the mark.
228
During the Board proceedings, Fischer was represented by counsel.
However, Fischer’s new counsel filed a motion for relief from
judgment, claiming that prior counsel had been negligent in failing
to respond to Anderson’s motion for judgment or the Board’s show
229
cause order.
The Board denied Fisher’s motion for relief from judgment
because Fischer had not established that her failure to respond to the
motion for judgment on the pleadings or the show cause order was
2.

219. See id. (“finding that a failure to explain why other authorized individuals
could not have assumed responsibility after counsel’s death weighed against finding
excusable neglect” (citing HKG Indus., Inc. v. Perma-Pipe, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1156
(T.T.A.B. 1998))).
220. Id.
221. See id. (“Abandonment is a question of fact, and the Board’s findings are
sustained if supported by substantial evidence.” (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2000))).
222. Id.
223. No. 2007-1152, 2007 WL 2947324, *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Anderson]. Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. This case was not
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.
224. No. 2007-1153, 2007 WL 2947323, *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) [hereinafter
Quad Int’l, Inc.]. Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. This case was not
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.
225. No. 2007-1152, 2007 WL 2947324, *1.
226. Id. at *1.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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230

She had also failed to establish
the result of “excusable neglect.”
231
The Board
any other reason to justify relief from the judgment.
found that Fischer had not established excusable neglect because she
232
was bound by the conduct of her prior counsel under Pioneer. The
Board also denied Fischer’s motion for reconsideration, and she
233
appealed.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision, finding no
234
The
merit in the three arguments Fischer presented on appeal.
court found that the Board did not abuse its discretion in considering
letters from Fisher’s prior counsel claiming that had he never
received Anderson’s motion for judgment or the Board’s order to
235
The papers at issue were mailed to prior counsel’s
show cause.
correct address and therefore were presumed to have been
236
received. Nor did the Board abuse its discretion in not considering
Fischer’s arguments that evidence in the record supported her claim
that prior counsel was negligent in failing to respond, as Fischer is
237
bound by the conduct of her prior counsel as a matter of law.
238
Her
Finally, Fischer failed to show “extraordinary circumstances.”
argument that prior counsel ignored repeated e-mails and telephone
calls concerning her application, ignored her new counsel’s requests
for her files, and improperly filed letters with the Board despite being
fired were not relevant as these actions occurred after the date the
239
Board granted judgment against Fischer on the pleadings.
240
In Fischer v. Quad International Inc., the companion case to Fischer
v. Anderson, the Federal Circuit ruled that Fischer had not presented
any arguments different from those presented in her appeal of the
241
Accordingly, the
TTAB’s decision in the Anderson opposition.
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision entering judgment
230. Id. Excusable neglect must be established under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Id.
231. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
232. Anderson, 2007 WL 2947324, at *1. Under Pioneer, the Board “was required
to impute to Ms. Fischer her prior counsel’s acts or failures to act, thereby rendering
irrelevant any distinction between [prior] counsel’s neglect and any neglect on
[Fischer’s] part.” Id.; see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507
U.S. 380, 396–97 (1993) (stating that clients must be held accountable for the acts
and omissions of their attorneys because the attorney is a voluntarily chosen
representative).
233. Anderson, 2007 WL 2947324, at *2.
234. Id. at *2–3.
235. Id. at *2.
236. Id.
237. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 396–97.
238. Anderson, 2007 WL 2947324, at *3.
239. Id.
240. No. 2007-1153, 2007 WL 2947323, *1.
241. Id. at *1.

2008]

2007 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

1065

against Fischer in the Quad opposition based upon the Board’s ruling
that same day denying her motion for relief from judgment in the
242
Anderson opposition.
G. Notice of Appeal/Writ of Mandamus
243

In re Rockwell Medical Technologies, Inc.
244
In In re Rockwell Medical Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that a writ of mandamus directing the TTAB to vacate its default
judgment, which cancelled a trademark registration, should be
construed as a notice of appeal. Accordingly, mandamus relief was
245
not appropriate.
Advanced Renal Technologies (“ART”) petitioned the TTAB to
cancel a registration owned by Rockwell Medical Technologies, Inc.
246
(“Rockwell”).
Rockwell did not respond and the Board entered
247
default judgment against Rockwell, canceling the trademark.
Rockwell appealed and, while on appeal, Rockwell and ART reached
248
a settlement. The Federal Circuit remanded, and the parties jointly
moved the TTAB to vacate its decision and reinstate the
249
The TTAB denied the parties’ motion for vacatur,
registration.
determining the parties had failed to show “extraordinary
circumstances,” and further denied Rockwell’s motion for
250
reconsideration.
The Federal Circuit noted that Rockwell’s petition was clearly
intended as a request for relief in the form of a writ of mandamus.
However, the court has broad discretion to consider whether such
251
filing constitutes a notice of appeal and noted that, “to appeal a
judgment of the TTAB, the party seeking appeal must file notice that
sets forth (1) the name of each party to the proceeding, (2) the
judgment, order, or part, thereof being appealed, and (3) the name
1.

242. Id.
243. 239 F. App’x 583 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 584–85 (“[H]olding that a party seeking a writ bears the burden of
proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief, such as by appeal” (citing
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S.D. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989))); Bankers Life
& Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (observing that “whatever may be
done without the writ may not be done with it” (citation omitted)).
246. Rockwell, 239 F. App’x at *584.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (“[C]ourts should look at the notice afforded by a document rather than
a litigant’s motivation in filing to determine whether a document constitutes a notice
of appeal” (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992))).
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252

The court found that
of the court to which the appeal is taken.”
Rockwell’s petition clearly met these requirements and that
253
Rockwell’s petition was timely if treated as a notice of appeal.
Further, the court has jurisdiction over the TTAB’s decision to deny
254
vacatur.
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. Res Judicata
255

In re Bose Corp.
256
In In re Bose Corp. (Bose II), the Federal Circuit applied the
257
doctrine of res judicata to preclude Bose Corporation (“Bose”)
from re-applying for trademark protection for the design of a
258
loudspeaker system.
This case involves a “long and tortuous prosecution history” that
259
spans almost thirty years. In sum, Bose had applied for trademark
260
protection for the design of its loudspeaker system in 1977. In that
application, Bose described its configuration as “an enclosure and its
image of substantially pentagonal cross section with a substantially
pentagonal-shaped top parallel to a substantially pentagonal-shaped
261
bottom.” Bose’s loudspeaker system design is depicted below:
1.

252. Id. (citing FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)).
253. Id.
254. See id. (“[A] party to a cancellation proceeding who is dissatisfied with the
decision of the TTAB may appeal . . . .” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a) (2000))).
255. 476 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007) [hereinafter Bose II].
256. Id.
257. Id. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars re-litigation of the same cause of
action. The doctrine applies where (1) the parties are identical, (2) there was a prior
final judgment on the merits of the claim at issue, and (3) the merits of the second
claim are based on the same set of transactional facts as the first. See Sharp Kabushiki
Kaisha v. ThinkSharp, Inc., 448 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Mayer/Berkshire
Corp. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 424 F.3d 1229, 1232 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
258. Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333.
259. In re Bose Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 WL 1787217, at *1 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 26,
2005) (citing In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
260. In re Bose Corp. (Bose I), 772 F.2d 866, 867 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
261. Id.
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After multiple appeals and remands, in 1985, the Federal Circuit
ultimately found Bose’s design functional and not worthy of
262
trademark protection (Bose I). Among other reasons, it found that
Bose’s advertisements touted the utilitarian advantages of its
pentagonal design and that the pentagonal design was previously
263
subject to a utility patent.
In 1995, Bose re-applied for trademark protection for its
loudspeaker system design and submitted a revised description of the
264
mark.
In its application, Bose defined the configuration of its
loudspeaker as follows: “[A]n enclosure and its image of substantially
pentagonal cross-section with a substantially pentagonal shaped top
with a bowed edge parallel to a substantially pentagonal-shaped bottom
265
end.”
Bose argued that the additional element of “a bowed edge” in its
1995 trademark application constituted a changed circumstance that
266
would override application of res judicata. Bose explained that the
bowed edge is an “arbitrary flourish” that entitled it to trade dress
267
protection.
It further argued that its submission of promotional
materials demonstrates that Bose does not tout the utilitarian
268
Lastly, Bose argued that new
advantage of its bowed design.
262. See Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333; see also Bose I, 772 F.2d at 867. When
determining whether a design mark is functional, the Federal Circuit applies the
Morton-Norwich factors, which ask (1) whether there is a utility patent showing the
utilitarian function of the proposed design, (2) whether the applicant’s
advertisements disclose the utilitarian advantages of its design, (3) whether there are
facts showing the availability of alternative designs; and (4) whether the design is the
result of simple or intricate manufacturing procedures. In re Morton-Norwich Prods,
Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
263. Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333.
264. See id. (pointing out the 1995 application).
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. See In re Bose Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 WL 1787217, at *4 n.7 (T.T.A.B.
Apr. 26, 2005) (citing Applicant’s brief). Bose did not otherwise alter the design of
its speaker system in the interim. Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1333.
268. Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1335.
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precedent on functionality changed the analysis of its loudspeaker
269
design.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected Bose’s 1995 application as
270
barred by res judicata.
The Federal Circuit found that the parties
to Bose I and Bose II were identical, that the court had already issued a
final opinion as to the functionality of Bose’s speaker design, and that
271
the two applications involved the same set of transactional facts. As
to Bose’s contention that the circumstances had changed, the court
observed that “we expressly acknowledged in Bose I that the ‘curved
front edge’ was part of the Bose design in our functionality
272
analysis.” Regarding the promotional materials, the Federal Circuit
stated that the materials demonstrate the utilitarian advantages of the
273
design as a whole. Whether the materials lack language regarding
the utility of the “bowed” edge is irrelevant, the court noted, because
Bose’s application is for the design as a whole and not just the bowed
274
edge.
Lastly, the Federal Circuit dismissed Bose’s argument that the
275
Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing Displays,
276
altered the functionality analysis.
TrafFix addressed an applicant’s
attempt to register an arbitrary element of a patented design, not the
277
The Federal Circuit found this language
design as a whole.
inapposite because Bose sought registration of its entire loudspeaker
278
design and not just the bowed edge.
Having dismissed each of
279
Bose’s arguments, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision below.
International Flora Technologies, Ltd. v. Desert Whale Jojoba
280
Co.
281
In International Flora Technologies, Ltd. v. Desert Whale Jojoba Co., the
Federal Circuit affirmed, per curiam, the Board’s holding that
International Flora Technologies, Ltd. (“Flora”) was barred by res

2.

269. Bose argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing
Displays, 523 U.S. 23 (2001), changed the functionality analysis because the Court
noted that an attempt to protect arbitrary features of a patent—such as a bowed
edge—might yield a different result. Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1335–36.
270. Id. at 1334 (reviewing the Board’s decision de novo).
271. Id. at 1337.
272. Id. at 1335–36.
273. Id. at 1336–37.
274. See id. at 1336 (noting that “bowed” is just another word for “curved”).
275. 523 U.S. 23 (2001).
276. Bose II, 476 F.3d at 1336.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 1337.
280. 243 F. App’x 619 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
281. Id.
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judicata from filing a cancellation action against Desert Whale Jojoba
282
Co., Ltd.’s (“Jojoba”) mark JOJOBASOMES.
Jojoba sought to register JOJOBASOMES in connection with “skin
soaps, essential oils for personal use, cosmetics, and hair lotions” in
283
International Class 3.
Flora opposed Jojoba’s application for
JOJOBASOMES based on its ownership of registrations for the marks
METASOMES, FLORASOMES, JOJOBEADS, and JOJOBUTTER in
284
International Classes 1 and 3.
Flora argued that confusion would
285
likely occur under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act.
Flora improperly introduced evidence showing ownership of its
registrations during the assigned testimony period of the Opposition
286
287
Proceeding. Under prior Rule 2.122(d) of the USPTO, Flora was
required to make its registrations of record “by appropriate
identification and introduction during the taking of testimony or by
filing a notice of reliance . . . showing both the current status of and
288
current title to the registration.” Flora merely attached printouts of
289
Because
its registrations from the USPTO to its opposition brief.
Flora did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 2.122(d), the Board
290
dismissed Flora’s opposition as a default judgment.
Once Jojoba obtained a registration for JOJOBASOMES, Flora
291
The issue
petitioned to cancel the mark on the same grounds.
before the Board, and before the Federal Circuit on appeal, was
whether the prior default judgment constituted a decision on the
292
merits such that res judicata would bar Flora’s cancellation action.
Flora argued that its failure to abide by Rule 2.122(d) was a
procedural deficiency that did not result in a final judgment being
293
issued on the merits of its claim. However, the Board disagreed and

282. Id. at 620; Int’l Flora Techs., Ltd. v. Desert Whale Jojoba Co., No. 92045643,
2006 WL 3192313, *1 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2006).
283. See Int’l Flora Techs., 2006 WL 3192313, at *1 (citing the registration
application).
284. Id.
285. Id.; see supra note 179.
286. Int’l Flora Techs., 2006 WL 3192313, at *2.
287. 37 C.F.R. § 2.122(d) (2007).
288. Id. at 2.122(d)(2).
289. Int’l Flora Techs., 2006 WL 3192313, at *2.
290. Id.
291. Id. at *1.
292. Id. As noted in supra note 257, a second suit is barred by res judicata if
(1) the parties are identical, (2) the same set of transactional facts are at issue, and
(3) a final judgment has already been issued on the merits of the claim at issue. The
Board did not discuss in great detail requirements (1) and (2), which were easily
met.
293. Id. at *2.
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dismissed Flora’s petition to cancel, holding that “even default
294
judgments give rise to res judicata.”
Notable for today’s practitioner, the circumstances that resulted in
Flora’s default judgment are no longer relevant. On August 31, 2007,
Rule 2.122(d) was amended to allow a party to attach photocopies of
its registrations to original opposition and cancellation
295
proceedings.
Although the appeal was decided by the Federal
Circuit on September 10, 2007, the amendment could not assist Flora
because the amendment only applied to proceedings commenced on
296
or after August 31, 2007.
B. Failure to State a Claim
297

McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp.
The Federal Circuit considered only one case during the 2007 term
298
on appeal from the federal district courts. In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel
299
Corp., the Federal Circuit reversed the Southern District of Texas on
two straightforward procedural questions involving pleading
requirements and genericness, reiterating the low pleading threshold
for trademark infringement claims, especially in cases where a
300
plaintiff proceeds pro se.
In McZeal, the pro se plaintiff submitted a ninety-five page
complaint claiming infringement of his patent and trademark rights
301
to INTERNATIONAL WALKIE TALKIE.
After the plaintiff’s
hearing for a preliminary injunction, the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas dismissed the complaint under Federal
1.

294. Id. at *3 (citing Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.
1492, 1494 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
295. See Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 72
Fed. Reg. 42242 (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com
/sol/notices/72fr42242_FinalRuleChart.pdf.
296. Id.
297. 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
298. See id. (reviewing dismissal by the lower court for failure to state a claim); 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000) (providing that “[t]he United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction (1) of an appeal from a final
decision of a district court of the United States” for patent disputes under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338 (emphasis added)); see also Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 490 F.3d 1340,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction over
the parties’ claims under the final judgment rule because the contempt order was
not final). McZeal involved both patent and trademark claims and therefore
jurisdiction was proper. McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1354.
299. 501 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
300. Id. at 1358–59.
301. Id. at 1355.
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Rule 12(b)(6) because “[t]here just aren’t any facts” supporting the
302
plaintiff’s patent and trademark infringement claim.
Citing Fifth Circuit precedent, the Federal Circuit observed that a
claim can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails to
303
allege facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit cited Supreme Court and Fifth
Circuit precedent applying a lower pleading standard for pro se
304
plaintiffs.
In the context of a motion to dismiss a claim of trademark
infringement, the Federal Circuit stated that:
a plaintiff must plead that a defendant uses a designation in
interstate commerce and in connection with goods or services
where the designation is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deception as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the
defendant with another person, and the plaintiff has been or is
305
likely to be damaged by these acts.

In reviewing the complaint, the Federal Circuit found that the
plaintiff alleged that: (1) Sprint Nextel uses the INTERNATIONAL
WALKIE TALKIE mark (2) for identical telecom services, (3) which is
likely to confuse consumers (4) as to the source of the plaintiff’s
identical mark and (5) which is causing the plaintiff irreparable
306
economic loss.
This, according to the Federal Circuit, clearly met
307
the pleading requirement of 12(b)(6) for pro se litigants.
The Federal Circuit also noted that the Southern District of Texas
improperly observed in its order that the INTERNATIONAL
308
WALKIE TALKIE mark is generic. Genericness is a question of fact
309
improperly resolved on a motion to dismiss.

302. Id.
303. Id. at 1356 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir.
2002)).
304. Id. (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d
986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)).
305. Id. at 1358 (citation omitted).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.; see McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. H-06-1775 2006 WL 4792779, at *1
(S.D. Tex. June 20, 2006).
309. McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1358.
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C. Standing
310

McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent
311
In McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of an opposition to
a motorcycle group’s application to register the trademark DYKES
312
ON BIKES for lack of standing.
The San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent (“SFWMC”)
applied to register the mark DYKES ON BIKES for education and
313
entertainment services.
Initially the examiner refused to register
314
the mark, stating that the word “dyke” was disparaging to lesbians.
After the Board remanded the case, the examiner considered
315
additional evidence and approved the application for publication.
Michael J. McDermott timely opposed and SFWMC moved to dismiss
the opposition for lack of standing and failure to state a legal basis for
316
The Board granted SFWMC’s motion to dismiss,
the opposition.
holding that McDermott lacked standing to oppose the mark’s
registration because he failed to establish a reasonable belief that the
317
registration would cause him damage.
McDermott challenged the mark as “disparaging based on the
inclusion of the term ‘dykes’” and also “alleged that it is comprised of
scandalous and immoral material because the mark in full is
associated with a pattern of illegal activity by the group applying for
318
registration of the mark.”
McDermott, however, had not shown that he would be damaged by
the registration. He could not show that he possesses a trait or
characteristic that is clearly and directly implicated in the proposed
mark because McDermott is a man and the registration would have
1.

310. 240 F. App’x 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal Circuit opinion is not
published. However, the TTAB’s decision is citable as precedent. 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
1212 (T.T.A.B. 2006).
311. 240 F. App’x 865.
312. Id. at 867 (holding that standing is a question of law and thereby reviewing
the Board’s decision de novo (citing Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d
1256, 1262–63 (Fed. Cir. 2007))).
313. Id. at 866.
314. Id. No trademark shall be refused registration on the count of its nature
unless it “[c]onsists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter.” 15
U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006).
315. McDermott, 240 F. App’x at 866.
316. Id. at 866–67.
317. Id. at 867. The court did not find that McDermott had sufficiently pled a
“real interest” under Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Id.
318. McDermott, 240 F. App’x at 867.
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319

no “implications” for a man. Nor did McDermott make any claim
in his opposition papers or present evidence demonstrating that
320
Finding no other basis to provide
others share his belief.
McDermott with sufficient standing to enable him to oppose the
registration, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s dismissal of the
321
opposition for lack of standing.
CONCLUSION
While many of the Federal Circuit opinions simply affirmed Board
decisions, the court did not hesitate to clarify the law (as to mere use
322
being sufficient to oppose an application) —or redirect the Board’s
thinking (such as consideration of foreign information available on
323
the Internet) —where the court clearly disagreed with the Board’s
decision. On issues of the mechanics of obtaining the registration,
the court appropriately deferred to the Board. The one case the
324
Federal Circuit considered from a district court was reversed,
reiterating the low pleading threshold in federal court, particularly
from pro se plaintiffs. While many of the cases were decided on longstanding precedent, they are nonetheless instructive for today’s
practitioner.

319. Id. In Ritchie, the court explained that an opposer of a mark’s registration
must have both a real interest in the proceedings and a reasonable basis for a belief
that he would be damaged by the registration. Id. (citing Ritchie, 170 F.3d at 1095).
“[O]ne method of establishing the reasonableness of belief of damage for purposes
of standing is for the opposer to allege he possesses a trait or characteristic that is
clearly and directly implicated in the proposed mark.” Id. (quoting Ritchie, 170 F.3d
at 1098).
320. Id. In Ritchie, the court stated that “‘[a]nother means that may be used to
demonstrate the reasonableness of . . . belief of damage is to allege that others also
share the same belief of harm’ . . . as demonstrated through surveys, petitions, or
affidavits from public interest groups.” 170 F.3d at 1098.
321. McDermott, 240 F. App’x at 868.
322. See supra notes 175–196 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 30–51 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 299–309 and accompanying text.

